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Representation of youth in the public debate in Greece, Italy and Spain: 
Does the political leaning of newspapers have any effect? 
 
 
Lorenzo Bosi, Anna Lavizzari and Stefania Voli 
 
 
Recent scientific studies have reached the near-unanimous conclusion that the media produce a 
stereotypical representation of young people. However, research in this area has not often 
scrutinised whether there are any significant differences in the coverage of the subject matter. 
Notably, this article examines whether the political leaning of newspapers has any impact on the 
levels of plurality in the news coverage of youth. On the basis of political claim analyses of six 
newspapers from three countries (Greece, Italy and Spain), we find that the coverage of youth in the 
public debate is very similar if we compare centre-right to centre-left newspapers. This suggests 
that the social construction of the concept of youth dominates in the adult world, regardless of any 
political differences. Nonetheless, differences emerge when young people are given the opportunity 
to speak for themselves; centre-left newspapers are more likely to recognise the agency of, and give 
a voice to, young people. 
 
Keywords: Youth; Public Debate; Claim Analysis; Agency; Media System; Polarised Pluralist 
Media Model. 
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Representation of youth in the public debate in Greece, Italy and Spain: 
Does the political leaning of newspapers have any effect? 
 
Traditionally, scholarly research has largely focused its attention on youth’s use – both as consumer 
and producer – of media, mostly in relation to new media (Messenger-Davies, 2001; Fyfe & Wyn, 
2007) and to the impact of media on young people—also in terms of civic and political participation 
(Cushion, 2009; Mazzarella & Pecora, 2007). Over the past years, youth studies have started to look 
at the ways in which media represent young people (Wayne et al., 2008; Mazzarella, 2003, 2007; 
Wyn, 2005; Kitzinger, 2000; Cushion, 2007).1 Generally, empirical research on media has brought 
to the surface a stereotypical representation of young people (considered in terms of an entire 
demographic category and social group), namely as lazy, troubled, disinterested, disengaged and 
dangerous (Mazzarella, 2003). This is also the perception of young people themselves, who feel that 
the media tend to portray their generation in a negative and unflattering light: as apathetic, bored 
and self-centred slackers (Pecora & Mazzarella, 1995). The news coverage of young people is 
similar to media coverage of those groups whose goals or actors differ from, and challenge, 
mainstream norms; for this reason, they are cast off as unimportant and delegitimised (Ashley & 
Olson, 1998). In both cases, delegitimisation creates the impression that actors are incompetent, 
incapable, disorganised and unable to engage in any kind of battle, and that they are capable only of 
creating disorder (Such et al., 2005, p. 316; Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012, p. 4).  
Another similarity between the two cases is the persistent denial of any agency – namely, active 
subjectivity, intentional action, choices, decision-making and forms of self-expression young people 
use to react to society (White & Wyn, 1998; Coffey & Farrugia, 2014) – and voice (i.e. the way 
young people represent themselves, tell their actions, express their claims) in media (Hartley, 1998; 
Giroux, 1998, 2000; Grossberg, 1994).2 Described almost exclusively by expert adults, such as 
politicians, psychologists, sociologists, doctors or teachers, young people remain “powerless over 
their own image presumed incapable of self-representation, not imagined to have a collective 
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interest which needs to be defended in the news” (Hartley, 1998, p. 52), in ways that are 
comparable to a colonised community. According to John Hartley, young people “are, in semiotic 
terms, a virtual but colonized ‘class,’ an ‘internal colony’ (...) apt to be characterized by 
‘colonising’ discourses of control, which function to represent them as weak, prone to victimisation 
or unruliness, and incapable of self-government” (1998, p. 64). Young people are subject to the 
media’s attempts to categorise them and generalise single problematic episodes, presenting these as 
typical of an entire generation, thus ignoring internal axes of difference such as age, gender and 
economic status.  
Building on such streams of research, this article examines a research question that to our 
knowledge has not yet received attention in scholarly literature: does a newspaper’s political 
leaning affect the way young people are reported in the public debate? The rationale behind our 
attempt to answer this research question is that we wish to empirically challenge the conclusion that 
there is only one way in which newspapers cover this subject matter. We will investigate this 
research question systematically, by analysing the public discourse on youth in three southern 
European countries (Greece, Italy and Spain), characterised by a similar Polarised Pluralist Media 
Model and recent socio-political context of crisis, through a political claim analysis of a random 
sample of 100 claims per newspaper.3 We collected claims via a keyword search (based on the 
words ‘young’, ‘student’ or ‘teenage’) in the digital archives of two newspapers per country, one 
centre-right and one centre-left, covering the period between 2010 and 2016 (EURYKA WP2 
2018).  
The article begins with an analysis of the way the concept of youth has been constructed 
throughout history, followed by an in-depth review of existing research on media portrayals of 
young people in the public debate. In the following section we will offer a concise discussion of the 
selection process of the countries and journals under examination, and we will also present the data 
sources. Given the exploratory nature of the analysis, the remainder of the article is dedicated to the 
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analysis of the research question. In the concluding section we discuss the results and provide 
further avenues for research.  
 
Young people in the media and in public debate  
The concept of youth is a constructed social category. Historically, it has been defined and 
redefined in opposition to the concept of adulthood. As Pierre Bourdieu has observed, “the 
relationship between social age and biological age is very complex [and] shows that age is a 
biological data that is socially manipulated and manipulable; and talking about youth as a social 
unit […] is already an obvious manipulation” (2002, pp. 144-145). In the past, young people 
themselves have very rarely been active in the construction of their own identities, basically lacking 
any agency in such a process, being dependent on adults as well as subordinated to them.  
In the patriarchal family, and particularly in rural society, (male) adults held a position of power 
over young people (and women at large), claiming a right/duty to protect, command or control (i.e. 
as fathers or employers). Young people, including women, were considered immature, unable to 
decide for themselves, and therefore dependent on male authority and on their categorisation as “the 
others”. Once the patriarchal family gradually started to enter a period of crisis, due to the advent of 
industrial society, which was based on the exploitation of female, youth and even child labour, the 
concept of youth started to change. Thanks also to the struggles of the labour movement and the 
development of the welfare state, access to adulthood progressively started to depend on legal, 
social and economic elements as well as civic ones. These included the progressive exclusion of 
young people from the workforce through changes in the industrial practice; the institutionalisation 
of public and compulsory education; and the right to vote, which implied civil and legal 
responsibility (Wartella & Mazzarella, 1990). These socio-political developments provoked an 
increasing rise of youth as a group deserving attention, protection laws and reforms (Wartella & 
Mazzarella, 1990). This new social group, defined now through social and generational parameters, 
began to be perceived as a subject of adult concerns and as an “object” of study and inquiry, but 
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also as “dangerous”—a potentially destabilising social group (Dogliani, 2003). As Mazzarella 
suggests, “several major studies and reports (see, for example, Hurt, 1924; Walter, 1927) were 
issued in the mid-twentieth century, documenting that youth were spending their newfound leisure 
time in questionable and ‘unworthy’ pursuits (i.e. hanging out with friends, movies, etc.). These 
reports called for the need to institutionalize leisure through such adult-sanctioned and supervised 
activities as scouting” (2007, p. 230). 
Modern notions of youth undoubtedly emerged as a result of the innovations of the industrial 
revolution, among which we must not overlook the access to mass media. We could say that “the 
very existence of youth, at least in the twentieth century, is intimately tied to the media and vice 
versa” (Grossberg, 1994, p. 26). From the mid-twentieth century onwards, mass media culture 
started to be strongly linked to youth culture, and adults became concerned with the protection of 
their children from what they perceived to be the harmful influences of mass culture: movies in the 
1920s, radio in the 1930s, rock’n’roll and television in the 1950s, counterculture in the 1960s, punk, 
rap music and drug addictions in the late 1970s and 1980s, Internet and videogame violence in the 
1990s, and so on (Mazzarella, 2007).  
More recent studies on the media coverage of youth have identified a polarisation between two 
opposed positions, where young people are represented both as offenders and as victims, namely of 
accidents, crime, violence, economic crisis or unemployment (Andersson & Lundström, 2007; 
Levinsen & Wien, 2011). As a result of this representation, or better, of this misrepresentation 
(Gaines, 1994), young people have become the “other”, “a group to be protected, saved and/or 
feared” (Mazzarella, 2003, p. 233) by adults. It is clear, using Mazzarella’s words,  
 
that when adults construct youth they invest it with properties and characteristics that 
they (adults) need for whatever reason at that particular time – the need to sell products, 
the need to justify cutbacks in government funding for youth programs, the need to 
make excuses for the downward mobility of the middle class, the need to look for 
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simple solutions to complex problems, the need to feel good about themselves as they 
age. Whatever the reason, it is clear that the mainstream (…) construction of youth is 
done by adults, for adults. (Mazzarella, 2003, p. 244)  
 
In this article such near-unanimous conclusion that the media produce a stereotypical representation 
of young people is questioned. We do this by examining whether the political leaning of 
newspapers has any impact on the levels of plurality in the news coverage of youth in three 
southern European countries (Greece, Italy and Spain). 
 
Case selection and data 
Media systems are a set of interacting media practices and institutions, embedded in the broader 
social, economic, cultural and political context (Hallin, 2015). The extent to which a country’s 
media institutions, practices and political structure are interrelated is a characteristic feature of 
different typologies of media systems, as the “[p]olitical structure thus comes to be embodied in 
certain ways of speaking about politics, conventions of communication that in their turn profoundly 
affect the possibilities for political discourse in the society” (Hallin, 1994, p. 25). In Dan Hallin and 
Paolo Mancini’s (2004, p. 21) seminal historical-qualitative analysis, the authors compared 
different Western media systems, taking the distinction between commercial and political logics – 
that is, the degree of commercialisation versus politicisation – as their basic criteria for 
differentiation. They propose four major dimensions of comparison: 1) the development of media 
markets; 2) political parallelism, namely the degree to which media are linked to political parties 
and institutions, thus reflecting the major political cleavages in society; 3) journalistic 
professionalism; 4) the role of the State in the media. Successively, they identified and 
distinguished three fundamental and ideal models4 characterised by common trends across the four 
dimensions. Firstly, the Mediterranean/Polarised Pluralist Media Model, which applies to countries 
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that have become democracies relatively late. This model is characterised by a strong government 
intervention in the economy and an elite-oriented press with a relatively limited circulation. In these 
cases, journalism is considered less professional, in the sense that public service companies follow 
national governments and their leadership’s political orientation. Moreover, the links between 
political actors and journalists are strong. Examples of countries that fall under the Polarised 
Pluralist Media Model are France, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain. Secondly, the Northern 
European/Democratic Corporatist Media Model is characterised by consensus, and by a strong State 
with a well-grounded legal system. The publishing sector is an important part of the Democratic 
Corporatist Model. Other features include a non-commercial public service and a high degree of 
autonomy for broadcasters. Journalism is professional and self-regulating, with common ethical 
standards being adopted for radio, television and newspapers. Examples of countries that fall under 
this model are Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Austria and Germany. Thirdly, the North 
Atlantic/Liberal Media Model is, instead, characterised by strong and widespread press freedom, 
and by strong individualism. Newspaper circulation is relatively high, although lower than in the 
case of the Democratic Corporatist Model. Politically, most of the countries that adopt this model 
have a majority system. Generally, the media are not strongly linked to the government and to 
political parties, but are governed by commercial interests, and journalistic professionalism is 
relatively strong. Countries that fall under the Liberal Model are, for example, the United Kingdom, 
the USA, Canada and Ireland. 
Given that our aim is to analyse whether the newspapers’ political orientations have any impact 
on the way young people are reported in the public debate, we expect that – if we adopt Hallin and 
Mancini’s (2004) distinction – any relevant difference can be traced in those countries characterised 
by a Polarised Pluralist Media Model.5 In this sense, we aim to look at how mainstream newspapers 
participate in the construction of the category of youth and, particularly, what role they play in 
shaping the social reality that affects youth, as they intervene in the public debate. For this reason 
we have selected, among the nine countries examined in the EURYKA project (and for which the 
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data were available),6 the following three: Greece, Italy and Spain.7 We are confident that the fact 
that this selection allows us to compare newspapers of centre-right and centre-left political 
orientations, in three countries characterised by a Polarised Pluralist Media Model, makes the 
comparison particularly meaningful, while also challenging the one-directional representation of 
young people in public debate that emerges from scholarly literature. Indeed, public debate and 
news production in polarised countries is not neutral, but rather shaped by different political 
orientations, values and beliefs, and interests.  
Taking a random sample of 200 claims per country, we searched for newspaper articles 
containing the keywords ‘young’, ‘student’ or ‘teenage’ in the digital archives of two newspapers 
per country, covering the period from 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2016 (see Table 1). We 
based our selection of newspapers on two main criteria: first, for comparative reasons we selected 
two leading, qualitative and mainstream newspapers for each country, one representative of the 
centre-left’s political views within the media system, and one of the centre-right’s views; second, 
we chose newspapers with a national coverage, in order to cover a larger portion of public opinion.8   
 
<INSERT TABLE 1 HERE> 
 
We studied the newspapers’ coverage of young people by including the major variables coded in 
the political claim analysis. In particular, we chose to focus on the following variables: the 
summary actor making the claims (eight categories of actors), the object affected by the claim 
(specific categories of summary actors including youth), the issues discussed in the claim, the forms 
through which claims were made in the public debate (verbal and non-verbal) and, most 
importantly, the positioning (positive, neutral, negative) of the actor towards the interests and rights 
of the object—this was particularly interesting when youth constituted the object of the claim. In 
addition, we created a new variable, one representing the political orientation of the newspapers 
included in our sample. We therefore aggregated the centre-left newspapers (= 0) and the centre-
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right newspapers (= 1) of the three countries under examination in our political orientation variable 
(n = 600). Moreover, in order to control country selection, we also aggregated the three countries of 
the Pluralised Media Model in one variable. For the purpose of the analysis, we employed 
descriptive statistics showing cross tabulations of the distribution of claims across these variables 
and the newspapers’ political leanings.  
The main idea was thus to highlight potential differences between centre-right and centre-left 
newspapers’ coverage of the actors intervening in the public debate, of the object of public 
discourse and of its evaluation, along with the coverage of the issues discussed and the forms of 
intervention in the public debate.  
 
Findings 
We started by first investigating the following question: to what extent is the public discourse about 
young people differently articulated, in terms of the positioning towards the object affected by the 
claim (positive, neutral, negative), in newspapers characterised by different political leanings? 
Obviously we will not focus exclusively on the positioning of the object affected by the claim, we 
will also look at how forms of intervention in the public sphere and issues adopted by non-youth 
actors,9 are given space in newspapers with different political leanings. 
In our case youth is the most frequent object of claims (88.9 per cent), both in newspapers with 
a centre-right (93.6 per cent) and centre-left (84.1 per cent) political orientation. This result might 
not come as a surprise, given that we selected – following the project’s youth-focused methodology 
– claims in which youth represented the object, except when claimants were young people 
themselves; in those cases we took into account claims that had non-youth actors as object. 
However, Figure 1 shows a first interesting result; at the aggregate level, positive claims towards 
youth objects are predominant both in centre-left (64.7 per cent) and centre-right (71.7 per cent) 
newspapers.  
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<INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE> 
 
Table 2 also confirms that the mean is positive for the overall claims on youth actors. Looking at 
the values of the standard deviation, we also see that the public debate on youth actors – and 
accordingly, on the appraisal of young people – is generally less polarised than the debate on non-
youth actors, where conflicting claims are far more present. These results clearly show that the 
coverage of youth in the public debate is similar if we compare centre-right to centre-left 
newspapers. The data might suggest that when youth constitutes the object of discourse, as a 
“group” constructed by media discourses, no relevant difference between the different political 
leanings can be identified. Consistent with this, as Eilders suggests, is the fact that “the 
corresponding standardized attention criteria and interpretation strategies, the uniformity of 
professional and class interests, the media’s observation of each other and their reciprocal co-
orientation are likely to produce high levels of correspondence in the media system” (2003, p. 4). 
This first result is in agreement with much research on partisanship in media coverage 
(Baumgartner & Chaqués, 2015; Salgado & Nienstedt, 2016), where we see how a newspaper’s 
ideological affiliation does not necessarily correspond with a bias in the coverage of certain issues; 
some questions may also provoke a higher level of consonance. 
However, as we will see in the course of the following paragraphs, although little or no 
difference exists between positive or negative stances when looking at youth as a homogeneous 
group, different nuances of this representation emerge, which concern the role that different 
categories of youth play as objects of public discourse. Similarly, variations in the forms of 
intervention and issues adopted by non-youth actors become visible, allowing us to problematise 
the media’s discourse on the “youth question” more broadly. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 2 HERE> 
 
After having observed youth as a homogeneous group, we look closer at the various categories of 
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youth present in the analysis, as in Figure 2. Our data show that university students are the most 
frequent objects across all newspapers (37.3 per cent), and that they are covered most in centre-right 
newspapers (42.3 per cent versus 31.7 per cent for centre-left newspapers). Furthermore, all 
newspapers tend to cover university students with the highest positive evaluation (67.1 per cent for 
the centre-left, 66.1 per cent for the centre-right), in comparison to the other categories of young 
people. This finding also hints to the assumption that higher-educated youth in positions closer to 
the privileged sectors of society receives more coverage in across newspapers.  
Moving forward, we notice that the most significant difference between centre-left and centre-
right newspapers concerns the category “youth in general”, which is almost twice as much in 
centre-left newspapers, while group-specific youths are slightly more present in centre-right 
newspapers. In addition, it is interesting to note that political youth and associations are far less 
presented as the object of discourse in centre-left newspapers, and that these also have a negative 
positioning (63.6 per cent). Here, again, while bearing in mind the overall misrepresentation of  
youth disengaged from politics, one would expect different non-youth, societal actors to further 
problematise this issue, by actually showing concern for and interest in politically engaged youth. 
The negative positioning towards the interests of politically engaged youth, at least in the centre-left 
newspapers, might also indicate that young people who are more closely or properly engaged in 
politics are indeed misrepresented—this finding could echo what was described before as the 
delegitimisation of youth active in politics, or as being incompetent or disorganised.  
Finally, in centre-left newspapers, state actors and the judiciary focus more on teenagers and 
school students (35.3 per cent), while in centre-right newspapers, the objects of their claims tend to 
be university students and young adults (44.8 per cent). This might suggest that centre-right 
newspapers are predominantly concerned with, and provide more visibility to, older groups of 
young adults, while centre-left newspapers are keen to pay attention and give more visibility to 
younger age groups, such as school students and teenagers. 
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<INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE> 
 
 
Interestingly, political issues, which cover an important part of the topics addressed by youth 
actors, play a marginal role in the discourse of non-youth actors, particularly in centre-left 
newspapers (10.2 per cent against 30.3 per cent for youth actors), whereas centre-right newspapers 
are more balanced (9.0 per cent against 10.8 per cent for youth actors). This constitutes an 
important finding, as it stresses the fact that the representation of youth disaffected by politics 
comes from non-youth actors, and is therefore a social construction made by adults, the media and 
other institutional actors, which contributes to perpetuate this image of youth in public opinion. 
Finally, as we have stressed in previous sections, dominant sources such as the media and experts 
can exert a considerable influence on how “youth questions” are dealt with and controlled. In 
particular, issues of unemployment and law, crime and disorder, but also education, can become the 
object of institutional practices aimed at controlling young people’s behaviour. Data have already 
revealed that, in centre-right newspapers, this type of issue (i.e. socio-economic, employment and 
education) receives greater coverage. In addition, we have noted that in centre-left newspapers, 
issues of law, order and crime are somewhat important to non-youth actors as well, and we will see 
that young people themselves, by contrast, do not perceive this type of topic as part of their 
representation and discourse (only 3.7 per cent of all issues). 
 
Thus far, through a comparison between centre-right and centre-left newspapers we have identified 
only minor differences in the coverage of youth in the public debate, although with different levels 
of polarisation in the debate, depending on the object. We will now continue by investigating to 
what extent youth actors are given the opportunity to make their voice heard in the public debate, 
comparing centre-right to centre-left newspapers.  
In the countries and newspapers we examined for our research, young people most frequently 
make claims in public debates about youth issues (29.2 per cent), followed by state actors (26.1 per 
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cent). These data nonetheless confirm the overall tendency to provide young people with a voice 
and visibility in the press, although with different nuances. Furthermore, as Figure 3 demonstrates, 
in most cases youth actors are more covered in centre-left newspapers (36.8 per cent), while state 
actors appear more frequently in centre-right newspapers (29.1 per cent). Hence, as “protagonists” 
endowed with agency and voice, youth appears to receive more coverage in the public discourse of 
centre-left political media and audiences. Education-related actors are the third claimants (15.3 per 
cent), and are more frequent in centre-right newspapers (16.7 per cent), a finding which is 
consistent with the great predominance of education as an issue of interest for both youth and non-
youth actors. With the exception of labour organisations and economy-related groups, which are 
more present in centre-left newspapers (6.1 per cent), all the other categories of actors (i.e. political 
parties, professional organisations and other civil society organisations) are more frequently 
covered in centre-right newspapers. We can thus reaffirm that, although in centre-right newspapers 
more actors are given a voice in the discussion of and intervention in “youth questions”, and with a 
higher frequency, in the centre-left press young people and their actions figure more clearly at the 
centre of the debate.   
 
<INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE> 
 
Looking at the distribution of the claims raised by young actors across their various groups, 
political youth groups and youth associations are overall the most visible claimants (38.2 per cent), 
followed by young adults and university students (33.5 per cent). As for political groups and 
teenagers, they are more present in centre-left newspapers (42.2 per cent and 17.4 per cent 
respectively), while for the other categories differences are not statistically significant (Figure 4). 
This finding reflects the idea that centre-left newspapers are not only keener to portray youth as the 
protagonist of the public debate about the “youth question”, but politicised youth in particular. This 
must be contrasted with the previous observation about political youth being an object of discourse, 
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which appears significantly less represented in centre-left newspapers, and with a negative 
positioning (that is, we assumed, as delegitimised and immature, disorganised political actors). The 
portrayals of youth as disengaged from politics are not backed by evidence in this case. Although 
the share of political groups and associations is not very large, youth turns out to be engaged in 
them, and reported as such particularly by the left-leaning press in contrast to centre-right 
newspapers. 
We must also remember that youth is more represented as an object of public discourse in 
centre-right newspapers, with a difference of 10 per cent, while it is given agency and voice as 
actor of the discourse in centre-left newspapers, with a difference of 15 per cent. This finding also 
suggests that, in the centre-left newspapers’ representation of youth, once young people express 
themselves in the public they tend to do so as a collective, politicised actor rather than as youth-
specific groups, as happens in a centre-right media representation. This is an interesting finding as it 
problematises some of the questions raised in the literature.  
On the one hand, there is a tendency to speak about youth as a “colonised community”, that is, 
the object of discourses in which young people are perceived as incapable of self-representation; 
this appears to be a more distinct feature of a conservative approach in the media. On the other 
hand, the idea seems to take shape that young people are also depicted as “would-be citizens” 
(Messenger-Davies, 2001), while actually engaging with politics. This confirms the thesis of 
Johanna Wyn, who has pointed out another dichotomy that affects media representations in this 
field: if young people are described as a social problem, at the same time they are the “hope for the 
future” (2005, pp. 31-32): as workers in the new economies, as symbols of a changing society or as 
cutting-edge consumers and fashion trendsetters, a commodity and/or a target market either to sell 
“youth” to an aging adult population or to sell products to young people themselves. Viewed from 
this last perspective, young people are positively acknowledged as a potential political force, and 
play an important role in the transition to a new social order, characterised by dislocation, flux and 
globalisation (Harris, 2004).  
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<INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE> 
 
If we examine the forms of intervention privileged by youth, verbal statements (73 per cent) and 
demonstrative protest actions (9.1 per cent) are more present in centre-left newspapers (against 58.9 
per cent and 6.4 per cent respectively, in centre-right newspapers). At the aggregate level, verbal 
statements are used consistently by youth (29.2 per cent). All the other forms of intervention are 
prevalent in centre-right newspapers. Thus, in both centre-left and centre-right newspapers, young 
people are more prone to use verbal statements (57.8 per cent and 35.4 per cent respectively) and 
demonstrative protest actions (19.3 per cent and 23.1 per cent respectively) (Figure 5).  
Overall, centre-left leaning newspapers seem to imply that, once young people are given a 
voice, this is because they use both conventional (statements, political decisions and actions) and 
unconventional forms of action (protests and demonstrations). By contrast, in centre-right leaning 
newspapers young people are more often given a voice once they use unconventional, 
confrontational and violent actions. In a way this reflects the main representation present in 
scholarly literature, namely that of “youth as offenders” and as “dangerous”. These findings are 
notably in contrast with those pertaining to non-youth actors; as we have seen, in centre-right 
newspapers a majority of conventional forms is used to treat and discuss youth objects. In this case, 
although young people maintain more visibility and voice in centre-left newspapers, and as 
protagonists of their own discourses (through verbal statements), we clearly see that youth, 
independently from the newspaper’s political leaning, is represented as engaged in rather 
unconventional forms of actions, including confrontational and more violent types of actions. An 
image therefore seems to emerge that reveals a “dichotomy” between forms adopted by non-youth 
and by youth, particularly in the representation offered by the centre-right press, which opposes 
conventional and unconventional repertoires of actions.  
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<INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE> 
 
 
Conclusions 
The focus of this article has been on plurality in the media coverage of young people (specifically 
with regard to youth issues). It has endeavoured to challenge the reading that there is only one way 
in which newspapers cover the theme of youth.  
Our analysis shows that, in terms of coverage, centre-left and centre-right newspapers do not 
differ much from each other, as they substantially converge in their ways of giving space to young 
people in the public debate also considering that we have selected countries characterised by a 
Polarised Pluralist Media Model, where we expect political differences between newspapers to be 
higher. In fact, positive claims towards youth objects prevail both in centre-left and centre-right 
newspapers.  
If youth generally doesn’t vary in media coverage, we have nevertheless seen important 
differentiations emerge in the newspapers’ contents, when we focus on multiple aspects of youth 
political participation. For example, if we look closer at the different categories of youth, we notice 
that centre-left newspapers offer a lower (and more negative) coverage of political youth and 
associations. This approach is in line with the leading journalists’ general narrative strategy (with 
few differences among the political spectrum) towards youth’s political engagement; journalists 
tend to delegitimise, minimise, marginalise and render young people’s political actions 
meaningless. As studies have shown, this strategy corresponds more with a set of journalistic 
practices, routines and news templates than with any deliberate and organised journalistic strategy 
to discredit young people acting in the public debate (Kitzinger, 2000; Cushion, 2007).  
At the same time, though, the representation that emerges when we consider young people as 
actors of claims differs if we examine centre-left versus centre-right newspapers; in this respect, the 
data reveal that centre-left newspapers provide better opportunities for young people to speak for 
themselves as opposed to centre-right newspapers. Furthermore, we see that once young people are 
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offered the opportunity to make claims, they tend to be presented as collective and politicised 
actors. This finding is supported by results on youth actors’ prevalent issues in centre-left 
newspapers; here, political issues are in fact more often discussed than in the centre-right press. By 
contrast, if we look at non-youth actors’ prevalent issues, mostly present in centre-right newspapers, 
the data reveal a general disengagement with political issues. This confirms what has been said 
earlier on media’s misrepresentation of youth, as being alienated by politics. Above all, it highlights 
the fact that different narratives may emerge when young people are enabled to get their word out 
(Pecora & Mazzarella, 1995; Mazzarella, 2003).  
Moreover, young people’s public discourse in the centre-left leaning press shows that they 
widely vary the objects of their discourse, as well as the issues discussed. Youth’s greater agency as 
a collective actor matches the current process, in which youth is renegotiating traditional patterns of 
political participation. Thus, we might assume that the centre-left press is able – more than the 
centre-right press – to recognise the existence of many new forms of youth politics and action 
repertoires, which have emerged in recent years and which have broadened the range of possibilities 
to define and represent the arena of youth participation. The more favourable approach towards 
youth participation is reflected in the way centre-left newspapers report the forms young people use 
to make a political claim; when young people are given a voice, centre-left newspapers do not 
stigmatise them by highlighting the confrontational and violent forms they use, as happens in 
centre-right newspapers. The latter, in fact, exaggerate the “violence template”, which creates the 
risk of eclipsing the many different forms of activism young people are capable of playing out 
(Cushion, 2007, 2009). 
We hope that this article will contribute to the discussion on young people’s coverage and 
representation in the public debate, and to existing research in this field, in that it provides an 
outline for a number of follow-up studies. Our study can, in fact, be expanded with more detailed 
and in-depth studies of the different ways in which young people are covered in local versus 
national, mainstream versus non-mainstream newspapers. Of special interest would be a study 
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clarifying the role of digital and social media in different representations of young people in the 
public debate. 
 
Notes 
 
1  The notion of “media representation” refers to the ways in which media literally construct social 
groups (based on age, sex, race, socio-economic conditions, education, etc.), using what 
Lippman refers to as “pictures in our head” (1991 [1922]), that is, culturally determined ideas 
that help media reach a wider audience, appealing to preconstructed images. In our analysis, it is 
important to underline that we build on the notion of representation starting from the one of 
coverage, i.e. indicating the extent, attention – in terms of frequency and content – given to 
youth across different newspapers. 
2  Despite the concise definition provided, this contribution is aware of the controversial 
sociological debate around “agency” as a category in youth studies. For a more detailed analysis 
of the issue, see Coffey and Farrugia (2014). 
3  A political claim is a strategic intervention, either verbal or non-verbal, in the public space made 
by a given actor on behalf of a group or collectivity and which bears on the interests or rights of 
other groups or collectivities. In other words, a claim is the expression of a political opinion by 
verbal or physical action in the public space (EURYKA WP2 2018). 
4  In 2008, Hallin and Mancini, together with a number of other researchers, conducted a study 
based on the three ideal models identified in 2004, but now complemented by a fourth ideal 
model: The Eastern European/Post-Communist Media Model, which included the Eastern 
European countries that were excluded from the study of 2004.  
5  Our article does not aim to use the Comparing Media System for theory development, to test it or 
operationalise concepts discussed there. Rather, we are interested in using it for the purpose of 
case selection, first of all in order to test the impact of the media’s political leaning on the 
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representation of young people; secondly, to verify the hypotheses that we have drawn from the 
literature on youth studies.  
6  Claims focusing on the representation of young people and youth-related issues were coded by 
random sampling and cleaning of 4,500 claims, selected from 45 newspapers (100 claims per 
newspaper and five newspapers per country) in the period ranging from 1 January 2010 to 31 
December 2016, in nine countries: France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the UK. They were selected with the aim of building a representative sample in 
terms of geographical distribution, political leaning and reporting style (EURYKA WP2 2018).  
7  We have no data on Portugal, while we deliberately excluded France, given that Hallin and 
Mancini describe it as a “borderline case” (2004, p. 90). In addition, France has not suffered the 
same type of economic crisis as the other three southern countries, during the years examined for 
our research. 
8  The selection was made on the basis of the newspapers’ sampling, carried out by each national 
team taking part in the EURYKA project, as well as through the collection of additional 
information from previous studies (Salgado et al., 2016), and the use of the Eurotopics database, 
accessible at: https://www.eurotopics.net/en/142186/media. 
9  We must recall that non-youth actors include the following summary categories: 1) state actors 
and the judiciary; 2) political parties/groups; 3) professional organisations/groups; 4) labour 
organisations and economy-related groups; 5) education-related actors; 6) other civil society 
organisations and groups; 7) other actors.  
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Country Newspapers’ political orientations 
Centre-Right Centre-Left 
Greece Kathimerini Ta Nea 
Italy Il Giornale La Repubblica 
Spain El Mundo El Pais 
 
Table 2. Position by Object Category and Political Orientation of Newspapers. 
 
Newspaper orientation Mean N 
Std. 
Deviation 
Centre-left Non-youth Actors 0.16 49 0.965 
Youth Actors 0.47 251 0.781 
Total 0.42 300 0.820 
Centre-right Non-youth Actors 0.16 19 0.898 
Youth Actors 0.60 281 0.696 
Total 0.57 300 0.717 
Total Non-youth Actors 0.16 68 0.940 
Youth Actors 0.54 532 0.739 
Total 0.50 600 0.773 
 
dies, social and political movements, youth political participation.  
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Figure 1. Positioning Towards the Object by Political Orientation of Newspapers. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Frequency of Youth Objects by Political Orientation of Newspapers. 
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Figure 3. Frequency of Different Actor Types by Political Orientation of Newspapers. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Frequency of Different Categories of Youth Actors by Political Orientation of 
Newspapers. 
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Figure 5. Forms Employed by Youth Actors by Political Orientation of Newspapers. 
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